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SUMMARY: This article analyses the evolution of European rural regional economies and the Commu-
nity’s public regional policies, with a view to drawing lessons for other areas of the world, especially La-
tin America. After presenting relative size data for the EU regions based on population, territory, employ-
ment and income, the article analyses the key economic and social trends in these areas, together with the
underlying explanatory factors. The main conclusion is that the economic development of the rural re-
gions of the EU is much more due to the overall national economic development issues, than to rural de-
velopment policies. Therefore, the way to achieve rural development is by means of a good overall eco-
nomic development policy, and national policies are more determining than EU-wide policies in the
overall economic development of the EU member states. The article finishes with a summary of the les-
sons to be learnt from EU rural development policy, which suggest the need for radical policy change ba-
sed on a reduction in the agricultural component coupled with an increase in the territorial and environ-
mental components.
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Desarrollo rural en la UE
RESUMEN: Este artículo analiza la evolución de la economía regional rural europea y las políticas re-
gionales públicas comunitarias, con el fin de aportar lecciones a otras áreas del mundo, especialmente
Latinoamérica. Después de presentar datos relativos al tamaño de población, territorio, empleo e ingre-
sos de las regiones europeas, el artículo analiza las tendencias clave económicas y sociales de estas
áreas, junto con los factores explicativos. La principal conclusión es que el desarrollo económico de las
regiones rurales de la UE es mayor debido en mayor medida a el desarrollo económico nacional que a
las políticas de desarrollo rural. Además, la vía para conseguir desarrollo rural es a través de buenas
políticas de desarrollo económico generales. El artículo finaliza con un resume de los aspectos a apren-
der de la política de desarrollo rural de la UE, sugiriendo la necesidad de un cambio radical de esta ba-
sándose en la reducción del componente agrícola unido a un incremento de los componentes territoria-
les y ambientales.
PALABRAS CLAVE: Economía de las áreas de desarrollo rural. Desarrollo económico general y polí-
tica de desarrollo rural en EU. 
Clasificación JEL: O18
1. Introduction
This paper was produced to assist those considering the Rural Development cha-
llenges facing South and Central America by examining the experience in this area of
policy in the EU. Four questions were posed:
1. What is the relative importance of the rural areas in the EU?
2. What have been the main social and economic trends in EU rural areas, and
the factors explaining these trends?
3. What lessons have been learned from Rural Development Strategies?
4. What policies are needed to adapt to open markets and globalisation?
Four preliminary points are necessary to provide a context for this summary of
Rural Development in the EU. First, since the 2004 enlargement, there is a very wide
disparity in general income levels amongst EU Member States. Second, these general
economic development levels provide most of the explanation of the different levels
of rural development. Third, whilst agricultural policy has been, and remains one of
the most elaborated policies of the EU, it has continually changed not least to accom-
modate new Members of the EU, and with the enlargement just achieved, and that in
prospect, it will change even further. Within all this the very concept of EU Rural De-
velopment Policy per se is new and under-developed. How it evolves in the coming
years is as open a question as the survival of the EU itself.
The EU is a fast growing supra-national organisation.  When the Treaty of Rome
was signed in 1957 to bring into being the EEC, it comprised a common market with
6 Members States (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands), a
population of under 200 million, an appointed Parliament and a highly protectionist
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pulation of 480 million, a fully elected Parliament, a fully developed single internal
market, a common currency adopted by 12 members, a written constitution –yet to be
ratified, and plans to develop foreign and defence policy.  
It is clear the growth in Membership and activity will continue for at least another
one if not two decades. There is not much which is stable, complete or certain about
the EU – it is in a state of continual development. There is nothing but political will
which maintains this momentum and the will is severely tested from time to time.
The failure to validate the written constitution and the hesitant approach to the acces-
sion of Turkey indicate that after five decades of strong forward momentum in the
EU, the bicycle is at best freewheeling and it could yet fall over.  It is not completely
outside the realms of possibilities that failure to pick up momentum could result in
retreat from some areas heretofore considered as central to the EU, the position and
role of the Common Agricultural Policy, and rural policy within this is one example.
Some key economic statistics of the EU are summarised in Table 1.
The EU-25 is the largest economic bloc in the world. With a GDP in 2003 of
€9.75 trillion this slightly exceeds that of the USA€9.73 trillion, and Japan at 3.8 tri-
llion4. Of course the US population is much smaller (at 291 million) so US income
per head 32,900 is over 50% higher than the average income per head for the EU-25
of 21,400 (at purchasing power standard).
This average income for the EU as a whole disguise the disparities which are now
contained within in its membership.  The disparities are in absolute size, as well as in
development level achieved.  The EU contains the earliest industrialising, and former
colonial powers, the UK, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands. The enlargements of
the 1980s brought in the, then, much poorer Mediterranean, also colonial powers, of
Spain and Portugal, plus Greece. The 2004 enlargement brought in poorer still coun-
tries of Central and Eastern Europe.
These disparities will steadily widen with further enlargements to bring in Roma-
nia and Bulgaria (in 2007) and then perhaps the SW Balkans and Turkey. 
The EU only has competence in policy areas where it is explicitly agreed that this
is the case.  The most developed areas of EU (with relevance to rural development)
policy concern the single internal market, and correspondingly external affairs, parti-
cularly trade, plus structural policy, environmental policy, and the Common Agricul-
tural Policy (CAP).  To give a perspective on the extent of EU involvement in general
governance of the Member States, the EU budget takes about 1% of the GNP of the
Member States for all its policies.  This should be compared to the approximately
50% of their GNP which most Member States spend on domestic policies.  
That half of the one percent of public funds channelled through the EU is spent on
agriculture has no more significance than this happens to be the main spending policy
the Member States have agreed to finance on a common basis. For historical reasons
(see Tracy, 1979) the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) was part of the foundation
of the EEC. It is only with the most recent enlargement bringing in countries noti-
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cies has exceeded the CAP. 
However, throughout the 45 year life of the EU there have been very strong forces
which have brought about continual changes in the scope and nature of the CAP.  
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TABLE 1
Economic Output of the EU Member States, 2003
Population GDPcurrent GDP GDP/head
million €m PPSm PPS/head
Index EU-25 =
100
Northwestern-12 320,4 8.284.208 7.708.870 24.060 112
1 Luxembourg 0,4 23.956 20.647 45.900 214
2 Ireland  4,0 134.786 112.960 28.300 132
3 Denmark 5,4 187.951 141.231 26.200 122
4 Austria 8,1 226.142 211.503 26.100 122
5 Netherlands 16,3 454.276 419.310 25.800 121
6 United Kingdom 59,9 1.591.412 1.514.215 25.300 118
7 Belgium 10,4 269.546 261.061 25.200 118
8 Sweden 9,0 267.251 220.559 24.600 115
9 Finland 5,2 142.518 125.892 24.100 113
10 France 61,6 1.557.245 1.459.504 23.700 111
11 Germany 82,5 2.128.200 1.906.307 23.100 108
12 Italy 57,7 1.300.926 1.315.681 22.800 107
Southern-5 63 1.043.684 1.228.154 19380 91
13 Spain 40,8 744.754 852.784 20.900 98
14 Cyprus 0,7 11.645 12.682 17.400 81
15 Greece 11,0 153.045 190.399 17.300 81
16 Malta 0,4 4.333 6.393 16.000 75
17 Portugal 10,4 129.908 165.897 15.900 74
Eastern-8 73 426.116 816.987 11169 52
18 Slovenia 2,0 24.576 32.756 16.400 77
19 Czech Republic 10,2 80.097 149.863 14.700 69
20 Hungary 10,2 73.213 130.967 12.900 60
21 Slovakia 5,4 28.822 59.884 11.100 52
22 Estonia 1,4 8.042 14.050 10.400 49
23 Lithuania 3,4 16.271 33.791 9.800 46
24 Poland 38,3 185.227 375.316 9.800 46
25 Latvia 2,3 9.868 20.361 8.800 41
Some future candidates for EU membership
26 Bulgaria 7,9 17.655 49.607 6.300 29
27 Romania 21,8 50.352 137.257 6.300 29
28 Turkey 71,0 212.268 418.706 5.900 28
EU-25 455,8 9.754.009 9.754.009 21.400 100
EU-15 382,7 9.311.915 8.917.949 23.300 109
USA 291,2 9.727.723 9.579.745 32.900 154
Japan 127,5 3.798.465 3.112.076 24.400 114
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(to 9), 1981 (10), 1986 (12), 1995 (15), 2004 (25) and in 2007 (to 27). The other ma-
jor factors explaining the evolution of EU agricultural and rural policy have been the
development of agricultural markets inside the EU and outside, the budgetary costs
of maintaining this commonly financed policy, and the pressures on the EU via in-
ternational trade liberalisation negotiations under GATT and now the WTO. This
evolution is well documented, on the trade aspects see Josling, Tangermann and
Warley (1996).
There are two critical conclusions from this evolution of the EU and its activities. 
1. The development of the rural areas in the EU is very largely explained, and
shaped, by national policies of the EU Member States and not the CAP; far
less EU Rural Development policy.
2. EU Rural Development policy, which has only existed under this name since
2000 is now in a state of flux. Nearly all the ideas for this aspect, the so-ca-
lled second pillar of the CAP, have developed to address the evolution of the
CAPand to address the problems of the EU-15. The real political influence of
the Member States from central and eastern Europe has still to be felt. Also
decisions on the EU budgetary funds for the period 2007-2013 decided in
2005, will have a very big influence on the scale and nature of EU Rural De-
velopment policy.
It is therefore very easy indeed to overstate the importance of EU rural develop-
ment policy per se in the development of Europe’s rural areas. The major factors de-
termining economic and social change in rural areas will be the wider political, eco-
nomic and social policies pursued by the Member States. This makes the story very
hard to tell for such a wide, and different collection of countries. 
2. The relative importance of EU rural areas 
The EU Commission in 2004 completed a large exercise called an Extended Im-
pact Assessment of rural policy development over the previous decades. This report,
Commission Staff Working Paper SEC(2004) 931, 14th July 2004, compiles data on
25 EU Member States not conveniently assembled anywhere else. Much of the data
in this section is based on this study. The data refer to averages for 1999-2001 unless
otherwise stated. The text describes the EU-25 average for each of the characteristics
and then summarises the range by indicating the countries with the highest and lo-
west levels for each variable considered5. 
Definition of rural areas. There is a long-standing and active debate in the EU
about the definition of what is a rural area, or what is the rural economy? Some argue
that in many European countries because the sectoral balance of the rural and non-ru-
ral economies are so similar (mostly services, some manufacturing and a little agri-
culture), and because there are such complex and large flows of exchange of goods
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living in towns and working in the country and vice versa), the distinction between
rural and non-rural has little meaning. This is emphatically, not the view taken here.
Because the land using sectors, agriculture and forestry are such an important policy
focus –with respect to food, raw materials and increasingly for environmental rea-
sons, and because the EU has well-developed policy focussed on the rural world, this
justifies the continued use of the distinction. However it is worth noting that there are
proponents of the view that there is no rurality justifying separate policies, or govern-
ment departments, under that name, and there are new attempts to delineate rural and
urban areas giving greater prominence to settlement patterns, see for example Bibby
and Shepherd (2004). 
Scale of the EU rural area. Most data for rural areas in Europe are based on the
OECD definition that local areas are rural if the population density is below 150 in-
habitants per square kilometre. At regional level, this gives rise to a three-way classi-
fication of regions based on the makeup of the communes in the region, and this is
the basis of much of the statistical evidence quote in this paper. Under this typology,
regions are categorised as follows:
• Predominantly Rural if over half the population lives in rural communes (ie
those with less than 150 people/km2), 
• Significantly rural if 15%-50% of the population lives in rural communes, 
• Predominantly urban if less than 15% live in rural communes. 
On these definitions, 57% of the EU-25 population (of 456 million) lives in the
rural regions. The total rural area of the EU-25 covers 94% of the territory. 
Territory in Rural Areas. There is considerable variation between the member
states; the Netherlands (57%), and Belgium (59%) have the lowest proportion of te-
rritory in rural communes. For nine member states (Austria, Cyprus, Estonia, Spain,
Finland, Greece, Ireland, Latvia and Malta) the rural areas account for 94% or more
of the total territory.
The extent of agricultural land as a proportion of surface area ranges widely. For
the EU-25 the average proportion of land which is agricultural is 49%. This ranges at
the low end from 7% for Finland, 26% for Slovenia and 30% for Cyprus, at the high
end to over 70% of the territory defined as agricultural land in Hungary (72%), Net-
herlands (75%) and Denmark (79%). 
Likewise there is a big range in the extent of forest cover and semi natural areas.
The EU average is 41%, ranging from 82% in Finland down to almost none in Malta!
Population There is a wide disparity in the absolute size of the EU Member Sta-
tes from 82 million Germans to 0.4 million citizens of Luxembourg. 
The most urbanised Member States (MS), measured as the proportion of the po-
pulation in predominantly urban regions are Malta (100%), Belgium (85%) and the
Netherlands (81%). According to the statistics, six Member States (Cyprus, Finland,
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Sweden and Slovenia) are the least urbanised, and therefore
most rural, having no regions classed as predominantly urban. 
Thus there is a wide range in population density. For the EU-25 it is over 600
inhabitants per km2 in predominantly urban regions. It is 125 inhabitants /km2 in
significantly rural regions and 38 in the predominantly rural regions. The predomi-
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averages.
Changes in population over the last decade show a complex pattern. Overall EU
population grew 3% between 1990 and 2000. Population fell in Estonia, Hungary,
Lithuania, Latvia and Slovenia, and grew very slowly in Italy, Poland and the UK.  
There was some difference between population growth rates amongst the three re-
gional types, but this was not a simple rural – urban difference. The population in the
predominantly rural regions and the predominantly urban regions showed slower
growth (at 2.2%) than in the significantly rural regions (4.6%) in the 1990s. 
This last observation is partly of a result of the process which is well under way in
some parts of some EU countries of counter-urbanisation. This is the reversal of the
trend established since the industrial revolution of people moving from countryside
to towns. Now in the richest countries there is a well established pattern of population
moving from town centre to suburbs, and from suburbs to the countryside. This is a
particularly pronounced trend in the UK, Netherlands, Greece, France, Spain, Den-
mark and Germany. It is a complex matter taking many forms highly conditioned by
the planning policies and fiscal rules of the country concerned. It is partly through the
creation of new towns and villages in expanding regions; partly by the expansion of
existing villages. It also shows as the conversion of former agricultural buildings into
residences. A noticeable sector of this counter urbanisation is the growing incidence
of second home ownership in rural areas. People want week-end or holiday homes in
the countryside. These pressures have important implications for rural housing prices
and rural labour supply. 
Demographic pressures. Two statistics are offered to indicate the changing po-
pulation structure. A variable called «demographic labour pressure» measures the ra-
tio of people aged 5 to 14 i.e. people about to enter the labour market, to people aged
55 to 64, i.e. those who are about to leave the work force. If this ratio is over one, it
indicates an excess of potential new entrants over retirees. The ratio is 1.08 for the
EU-25 overall, and rises as we move from urban to the more rural areas. It is particu-
larly high in the predominantly rural regions of the new Member States. This poses a
very important challenge for rural policy in those countries. 
The second demographic variable is the proportion of older people (over 65).
Overall this averages 16% for the EU-25.  The lowest proportion of older people is in
Cyprus and Slovakia (about 11%) and the highest proportion of older people is in
Italy, Sweden and Greece (over 17%). The incidence of older people does not vary
much between the rural and urban regions –it is interesting to note the countries
where the concentration of older people in predominantly rural areas is particularly
high and often above that in predominantly urban areas these are: Spain, France, Gre-
ece, Italy, Portugal, Sweden and UK. 
There are increasing concerns about the declining birth rate across much of the
EU. The population structure is changing significantly with a steady increase in the
age of the most populous group in the population. This will eventually turn up-side-
down the usual pyramidal shape of the demographic structure of the population. The
bulge group is now the middle age group, and will, in a decade or two, be the elderly
in society. This has far-reaching implications for overall economic growth rates (slo-
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derly have quite different expenditure patterns than the young. As the elderly like to
move to the countryside, it creates particular challenges for rural areas, in particular
service provision – especially for health and social services, housing and transport. 
Unemployment averages 9.8% across the EU-25. It is highest in Slovakia (18%)
and is over 10% in Estonia, Spain, Finland, France Greece, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania,
and Portugal. The EU average unemployment rate rises as we move from predomi-
nantly urban (8.1%), to significantly rural (10.7%) to predominantly rural (11.1%) re-
gions. That is, generally speaking there is more unemployment in the countryside
than in the towns. However, and importantly, the reverse is true in some counties for
example UK, France, Estonia and Austria.  
Employment in Agriculture. For the EU-25 the average percent of the work-
force in agriculture, hunting, forestry and fisheries (2000-2002) was 5.5%. It is a lit-
tle lower for the EU-15 at 4.1%, indicating it is higher in the new Member States. The
range is wide. It is lowest in the UK (1.4%) and it is under 2.6% in five others (Bel-
gium, Germany, Luxembourg, Malta, and Sweden. It is highest in Poland at 19% and
is over 10% in four others: Lithuania, Latvia, Greece and Portugal. Unsurprisingly,
the proportion of the workforce in agriculture rises steeply from urban (2%) to signi-
ficantly rural (6.6%) to predominantly rural (13.1%) regions. In Greece, Portugal and
some of the new MS, in the predominantly rural regions the agricultural share of em-
ployment rises to well over 20%.
Incomes. Given the features of the rural areas described to this point, it will not
be a surprise to note that there is a big disparity of incomes per capita between rural
and urban areas and between the EU Member States. The Commission has calibrated
GDP/capita figures on a Purchasing Parity Standard for the member states and the th-
ree broad regions, all based on an index EU-25 = 100. The range is very large indeed:
there is a six-fold difference between the index of 212 for Luxembourg, the highest,
to the index of 35 for Latvia and 38 for Lithuania –although admittedly these are all
small countries. The EU-15 average index is 109. All the new Member States have
incomes below the EU-15 average, indeed eight of the ten new Member States have
incomes below the lowest of the EU-15 (which is Portugal at 77). The exceptions are
Cyprus (83) and Malta (77) who are only just above Portugal in income per capita. 
As to be expected, the index of average per capita incomes drops as we move
from urban (125) to significantly rural (87) to predominantly rural (71) regions. 
3. The main social and economic trends in the rural areas of the
EU, and the factors explaining these trends
It cannot be emphasised enough that generalisations for the EU-25 based on sta-
tistics averaged over the Member States are often unsafe. Although essentially the
same drivers of observed social and economic trends in rural areas are at work across
the EU, there are big differences in the extent to which these trends have progressed.
To address this section therefore the EU is described in three groups categorised ac-
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way split can be described geographically as a North West group, a Southern group
and an Eastern Group. Of course, geographically, France, and especially Italy, span
north and south, but from the perspective of their economic structures and political
history these two are key members of the NW group.
• The North and West group of 12, (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Deutschland,
Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Sweden and United
Kingdom, This group has 70% of the EU population and creates 85% of its
GDP)
• The Southern 5, (Cyprus, Spain, Greece, Malta and Portugal, 14% of EU po-
pulation and 11% of GDP) 
• The Eastern 8, (Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland,
Slovenia and Slovakia. 16% of EU population, 4% of GDP).
The point is that the EU was founded and almost entirely shaped, and is financed
by6, the NW group. This is the source of the economic and political, and importantly,
to date also, the intellectual driving force for the most important developments of the
EU and its policies –including rural policy7. Although, of course, the EU will only
survive if all members feel they have a share in influencing its path, and for sure, the
influence of the South and the East will increase the longer they are in Membership,
it is simply a fact that the preponderant weight of economic and political power is in
the NW. This can be seen in the table on page 4. It is no accident that these happen to
be the countries with the longest established pluralist democratic structures and insti-
tutions, with mixed market economies based primarily on private factor ownership
and enterprise. The Southern group were admitted as soon as they adopted the neces-
sary governance structures. The Eastern group likewise, but much later and at a lower
development level. 
These political/economic facts are the major determinants of the differences in the
level of economic development achieved which shows up also in the extent to which
agriculture has shrunk relative to the rest of the economy.
It cannot be emphasised enough that before even mentioning agricultural or rural
policy, by far the preponderant explanation of the level of incomes –and any other
measure of well-being of citizens– in the rural areas of any of the 25 European coun-
tries under discussion, is the overall level of income of all citizens of that country.
Thus the reason that rural citizens in most of the EU-15, particularly the NW12, are
much better off than rural citizens in the new Member States is because the EU-15
economies as a whole are much better developed than the new member States. It has
nothing whatsoever to do with the rural policies pursued either by the individual
member states or the EU as a whole. In short if you want the rural economy of a
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a whole grow. The principal relevant policies are thus: macro-economic policies; the
governance system; the institutional structures in place especially the rule of law and
well established property rights; the training and education system and an encoura-
ging attitude to private business.  
If we really wanted to trace out the explanation for the patterns and trends of rural
development summarised amongst the EU-25 member States for the 20th Century,
these above are, by far, the most important variables on which to focus. 
The following is a stylistic attempt to clothe the bare statistics of section 1 and the
above generalisation, with some qualitative descriptors of the different social and
economic patterns and trends of these three groups of EU Member States. The lack of
statistical backing for many of the assertions which follow is a reflection of the fact
that there is almost no effort to collate statistics for these wider issues across the EU.
As the EU policy focus is agricultural, the statistical focus is also agricultural .
We have seen in section 1 that income levels are highest for the first group, the
NW-12, lower for the second group the S-5 and lowest for the third group the E-8.
The importance of agriculture in the economy –measured by GDP contribution and
proportion of the workforce in agriculture is lowest for the first group, higher for the
second and highest for the third. 
The North West 12 are mature, service economies where agriculture has sh-
runk in every case to under 3% of GDP and 6% of employment. Food, beverage
and alcohol consumption remains at around a fifth to a quarter of household expendi-
ture but a very large and steadily increasing part of this expenditure is in the form of
processing, packaging, storage and transportation value-added, and particularly in the
form of food service. This latter takes the form of pre-processed foods, convenience
foods, ready made meals and increasingly food consumed out of the home. 
There is also a highly developed supply sector upstream of farming. This, of
course, supplies the obvious purchased inputs associated with intensified agriculture:
plant and animal genetic material, animal feeds, fertilisers, energy, crop protection
chemicals, animal health products, mechanisation, buildings, plant and equipment. It
also supplies numerous services: finance and credit; legal; insurance; accountancy;
economic, agronomic and fiscal advisory services and consultancies; land manage-
ment and land transaction services; marketing and trading; information and, increa-
singly, information processing. The economic contribution of the food chain inclu-
ding both upstream and downstream sectors is thus typically three times that of the
primary producing sector. 
Thus the first trend is the relative shrinkage of agriculture as a part of the total
economy and as a part of the food economy. There are no signs that this process has
reached its end, even in countries (like the UK) where agriculture is already less than
1% of GDP. This relative shrinkage is accompanied by an outflow of labour services
from agriculture. 
The second trend is that the upstream and downstream sectors show structu-
ral change, innovation and productivity growth much faster than agriculture.
The industries producing many of the inputs are highly sophisticated, knowledge and
capital intensive enterprises many of these are now globalised, multi-national con-
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animal health products and machinery. There are large economies of scale in these in-
dustries and concentration has progressed to the point where there are top-five con-
centration ratios for certain products in certain markets of over 80%. Much agricultu-
ral research and extension has passed from the public sector to these private sector
companies. 
Concentration in the food processing and food distribution and retailing sectors
has proceeded just as far as in the input supplies. Farmers thus buy from and sell to a
very small number of concerns. This has been a steadily emerging factor of 20th Cen-
tury life, the extent to which farmers have been able to create organisations, co-ope-
ratives or other farmer-controlled businesses, to help manage this imbalance in mar-
ket power is very variable across commodity sector and EU Member State. 
Food processing and distribution has shown tremendous technical change and in-
novation. Retailers now offer product ranges of tens of thousands; they aim to pro-
vide year round continuity of many lines previously thought as seasonal products.
They achieve this by global sourcing and highly sophisticated food chain manage-
ment, based on concepts like efficient consumer response, and just-in-time delivery.
The logistical management skills and information processing capacity of this sector
is unrivalled. The Chief Executives of these companies are often held up as exem-
plars of dynamic capitalism as they are managing concerns with large numbers of
employees, and rapid technological change and product development. Nearly all pro-
duct quality specification, including hygiene and safety assurance and control, is now
managed by these retailers. There is a very high rate of new product development and
innovation in this sector. 
Competition amongst these oligopolists is fierce. Although the extent of globali-
sation of food retailing has proceeded much slower than input supplies, constrained
by national and local specificities in tastes and preferences (and to a minor extent,
language), it is now beginning to take place. The largest food retailers in Europe are
beginning to have a presence in many countries outside their national base. 
National and regional food consumption patterns still show important distinctions
across Europe. There are quite different tastes and preferences for the form and ba-
lance of meats (red meat vs pork vs poultry), carbohydrate staples (potatoes vs breads
vs pasta vs rice), dairy products and fruit and vegetables. These reflect long-establis-
hed culture, customs and culinary traditions –themselves partly conditioned by cli-
mate. But the convergence of life-styles and social and family structures which ac-
company the twin phenomena of multiple wage earners in the household and the
domination of office, rather than factory or farm-based occupations, plus the sprea-
ding media of TV and Film, and the dramatic lowering of the cost of international tra-
vel, are steadily eroding these differences. The penetration of electricity, the main
white goods (cooker, refrigerator, freezer and microwave) is advanced. The prepon-
derance of the population shops in supermarkets. The point is not that particular Eu-
ropean people don’t have different dietary tastes and preferences, but that increa-
singly people have the widened choice of consuming not only their own favourites,
but everyone else’s too. International mass travel, both business and pleasure –within
and beyond Europe– is a major factor in this trend.
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qualitatively) is that, after the general economic development level of the country, the
second main group of determinants of the development of rural areas are these fac-
tors. This is now beginning to be seen quite clearly in the new Member States of the
EU where the major source of investment, innovation and development in the rural
sectors is the inward investment by Western European supply, food processing and
retailing companies. 
The third trend is the structural adaptation of farming to these develop-
ments. Because of deep-seated land ownership and inheritance patterns across Eu-
rope, the predominant farm structure is still the small family farm or peasant hol-
ding8. Land ownership structures are highly fragmented. However, over the decades
ways have been found by land renting and by the creation of co-operative farming
structures of establishing farming operational structures which are much larger, often,
but not always, more specialised, and thereby lower cost and more efficient9. 
Labour and land are substituted by capital to increase productivity. There is a net
out-migration of labour from the sector. Because the predominant production unit is a
family this out-migration often takes the form of members of the family finding off-
farm work, and eventually the farm principals, the farmer and spouse, themselves ta-
king part-time work elsewhere, or they develop parallel income streams whilst remai-
ning with at least one foot «in farming». A high proportion of farmers in this NW
group have such off-farm earnings streams. The opportunities to do this at all, and the
range of alternative earnings opportunities varies by Member State and Region. In
the more densely populated regions for example in Netherlands, Belgium, SE En-
gland and N Italy the full range of industrial and service sector employment activities
in nearby towns may be available. Likewise in parts of W Germany where the total
population is spread in many medium sized towns rather than fewer very large cities,
more of the rural population is within driving distance to such employment opportu-
nities. In other regions more distant from any towns, there is a narrower range of al-
ternative employment opportunities with greater reliance on the land based ones such
as food processing, crafts and tourism. 
There is a parallel development in those parts of agriculture which are labour in-
tensive –for example in fruit and vegetable harvesting and, increasingly, in pack-
house work– where the labour is seasonal and casual. Increasingly, as labour markets
are gradually freed within the EU, it is supplied by immigrants. Just as in the United
States, a significant part of this aspect of labour is supplied by people whose citizens-
hip status, working conditions and wages are not up to the same standards as for the
bulk of the working population.
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8 The UK has been, as it is many other ways too, an outlier in this regard.  In the UK primogeniture
prevails (i.e. inheritance by the elder son) and the fiscal system has favoured the retention of larger farm
structures. 
9 The author is not aware of detailed studies of the legal and institutional basis of farm operating
structures in the EU Member States. These have become very fluid in the UK with significant develop-
ments of farm contracting, share farming and a multitude of short-term, land licensing and leasing arran-
gements and land swaps. 
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nection for the bulk of the population between their lives and the process of food
production. People who are removed for several generations from the countryside
and thereby from the natural seasons and cycles of birth, growth, development, dise-
ase, disaster and death which accompanies the biological processes of rearing plants
and animals for food, become detached. They forget the inherent variability and un-
certainty of nature and their capacity to assess risks becomes clouded. Yet the consu-
mer is sovereign in the consumer society. The shifting values of consumers, their at-
traction to fashion, to change and to what they see as good causes, creates both
opportunities for the food chain (for example for the innovation in new recipes and
new convenience products) but also sometimes deep challenges for farmers and parts
of the food chain. Three such challenges, which involve large and important debates
in the EU, (but most strongly manifest in the NW-12 group) concern (i) the use of fer-
tilisers and plant protection products in agriculture and the organic farming move-
ment, (ii) animal welfare issues and the vegetarian movement, and (iii) the place of
modern biotechnology in food production.
These issues are already important in the food and agriculture debate in the NW-
12, and this is slowly spreading to the international debate.
The fifth trend which is well established in the NW-12 group of EU member
States is the set of wider demands placed on farmers –most of which centre on
some aspect of the environment. The arguments will be spelled out in some detail be-
cause this trend explains a good deal of the current rural policy debate in Europe
which is often not well understood outside Europe10.
As the countries in this NW-12 group became wealthier they have become more
aware of, and more concerned about, the environmental impacts of their own con-
sumption patterns. Because agriculture manages a very large part of the territory of
this group of counties, and because it has very obvious impacts – both good and bad -
on the environment, farming and the environment are topics of continual comment
and debate in these countries11.
The principal trend of industrialisation and the creation of the service economy
in the 19th and 20th Centuries in Europe led society to become better fed, freer from
disease, more mobile thanks to mass transportation (itself environmentally dama-
ging), much better informed by mass media, and with greater capacity to influence
affairs through popular democracy and special interest groups. With these new faci-
lities society first became aware, and then started to care, that economic develop-
mental gains comes at some cost to the rural environment. Another way of expres-
sing this is that the very forces of technical change and economic advance which
caused the supply of rural environmental and cultural landscape services to fall, si-
multaneously helped bring about the situation where the expressed demand for
these services increased.
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this section are uniquely European or confined to the NW-12 group, they are not.  What is unique, it is
suggested, is the extent to which they are centre stage in the rural policy debate. 
11 The following 14 paragraphs are adapted from Buckwell and Armstrong Brown  (2004).
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12) has now the biggest, safest and best, quantity and variety of food and drink pro-
ducts available to it of any time in history or any place on earth. This is all fundamen-
tally the fruits of the earth, but with increasing contributions of other parts of the food
chain up and down-stream of farming. Yet, and apparently paradoxically, the value
(per unit) of food, however expressed –in real prices, in hours worked to buy a loaf of
bread, or shares of disposable income spent on food– has systematically fallen. The
farm-gate share of consumers’ food expenditure has been driven down by three fac-
tors. First, the sheer resource cost of producing the food has fallen propelled by the
technical progress outlined above. Second, the transformation of food through time
(storage), place (domestic and international transport) and form (through processing,
and adding preparation and convenience) has multiplied the raw commodity value
many-fold. Third, as consumers’incomes have risen they are able to extend their ex-
penditures far beyond the basics of food and shelter necessary for survival.
As the value of marketed food at farm-gate has dropped in real terms, the value of
the non-marketed outputs of the countryside has risen. The majority of the population
still lives in towns, suburbs and cities in conditions of high population density. Their
demands for the space, greenery, solitude, fresh air, varied nature and recreational op-
portunities offered by the countryside all rise. We observe a huge growth in the ser-
vice sectors catering for these demands. These activities generate employment, in-
come and wealth in the rural economy12. They depend vitally on the intrinsic
attractiveness of the rural areas. In the vast majority of the rural areas of this NW-12
group –especially that in easy reach of the bulk of its population– this attractiveness
has been moulded by the activities, over centuries, of farming and forestry. This envi-
ronmental and cultural landscape value takes a multiplicity of forms: the changing
field colours and textures over the seasons and the years; the rolling landscapes of
farmed countryside; the mix of farmland, wetland and woodland; the regionally va-
ried, vernacular architecture of rural housing and farm buildings using local mate-
rials; the rich patterns of field boundaries, walls, hedges, banks, ditches, dykes and
fences; the adapted wildlife where farming, forestry and nature have adjusted one to
each other; the customs, folklore, language, dialects, costumes and cuisine. 
So much of European cultural and heritage value is rurally based because until the
industrial revolution so much of European population and wealth was rurally based.
For many generations, Europeans moved off the land to the cities because this is where
incomes and living standards are higher, and most «modern» activities required the
scale and proximity of urban living. It is only in the second half of the twentieth Cen-
tury that the developments in the service and creative sectors, in business structures
and, particularly, in communications have permitted the opposite process to take place.
The rural areas become more desirable, and rural house prices reflect this trend. 
It is this combination of the declining real value of farm-gate food production and
the rising value of the non-market outputs of the rural areas which may usher in a
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12 The most startling demonstration of this effect was the relative magnitude of the loss of rural tou-
rism and recreation activity during the shut-down of the countryside in the 2001 Foot and Mouth Disease
epidemic in the United Kingdom, which was uncompensated and far exceeded the loss to agriculture.
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are moving, or in some regions we have moved, to a situation where the value of land
in terms of its non-market environmental and cultural landscape outputs is higher
than its value in food production alone, and that society has found ways explicitly to
demonstrate this. 
However the economic developments, including the rising agricultural producti-
vity summarised here have, naturally, come at what we now regard as a high cost to
the environment. The negative environmental impacts of twentieth century agricultu-
ral intensification are very well documented. The provision of public goods and ser-
vices from farmed countryside has declined in the past three or four decades. This in-
cludes detrimental changes to biodiversity, landscape, natural resources such as soil
and water, and the rural economy.
Environmental organisations in Europe, both governmental and non-governmen-
tal, have done considerable research on measuring many of the environmental im-
pacts of agriculture. This shows up as: 
• loss of habitat diversity at farm and landscape scale resulting from business ra-
tionalisation (loss of mixed farming; loss of non-cropped habitat on farm);
• changes in crop type and structure, especially the switch from spring to autumn
tillage, the associated loss of over-wintered stubbles and the loss of breeding
habitat for ground nesting birds for example lapwing and skylark 
• direct effects of pesticides on flora and invertebrates (around 10% of the 700-
800 species of insect in cereal fields can cause a commercial threat, but most
can be removed from the ecosystem by pesticide use);
• indirect effects of pesticides including the removal of plant and invertebrate
material from the food chain;
• use of inorganic nitrogen to promote grass productivity at the expense of broad-
leaved flora.
The impacts of agricultural intensification have not fallen on biodiversity alone.
For example the English Countryside Agency has mapped England’s landscape into
159 countryside character areas, based on distinctive features which are often a result
of regional farming patterns. Together with insensitive development and mineral ex-
traction activities, widespread intensification of agriculture is cited as a threat to al-
most all the countryside character areas. The key features associated with intensifica-
tion from the landscape viewpoint are the expansion of monocultures, the loss or
fragmentation of field boundary features and woodlands, improvement or overgra-
zing of extensive grazing land, and drainage and canalisation of rivers. 
Agricultural soil management is associated with a range of environmental im-
pacts. Again, taking England as an example, around 2.3 million tonnes of soil are es-
timated to have been lost from agricultural soils by erosion between 1995 and 1998,
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relatively speaking, in harmony with nature, Second Generation Agriculture– industrial agriculture mid-
17th Century to the 20th Century, has been environmentally very destructive. Now at the start of the 21st
Century in Europe there is a determination to find the third Generation, post-industrial agriculture which
retains the productivity of the second generation but is more harmonious with nature. 
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and machinery are thought to be linked to increased run-off and flooding. Raised soil
nutrient status and loss of nutrients from soils is an increasingly important aspect of
water pollution, and agriculture is estimated to be the source of 70% of nitrogen, 40-
50% of phosphorus and 50% of the silt pollution freshwaters in England (DEFRA,
2004). 
Agricultural change is not limited to the past few decades. Indeed, dramatic chan-
ges have been taking place on farmland for centuries, from forest clearing to new ro-
tations to the enclosures. Fertilisers, pesticides and mechanisation were introduced in
the early part of the 20th century. But for a short window of three decades (1960s–
1980s) the rate and extent of change may have outstripped the ability of natural sys-
tems to buffer or adapt to it. 
These tendencies are not, of course, confined to England. There is now systematic
work underway to try and monitor these environmental impacts on a comparable ba-
sis across the EU. The European Environment Agency has developed a set of 35 indi-
cators under the IRENA Operation (Indicator Reporting on the Integration of Envi-
ronmental Concerns into Agricultural policy) and has just produced its first major
report and conclusions on the feasibility and usefulness of this kind of work (EEA
(2005). This work to date only extends to the EU-15.
There is now some evidence that the agricultural sector in the EU has been con-
tracting from its zenith of the 1990s in terms of gross volume of output, and use of
many environmentally significant inputs. Static or even declining future demand for
raw agricultural output14 would tend to lessen these pressures. Intensified competi-
tive pressures and international trade exposure will mean that more of the remaining
output is produced by the most efficient farmers. The question is whether these pro-
ducers are systematically more intensive users of environmentally sensitive inputs,
and whether they manage these inputs in a more damaging way than the less efficient
producers they have displaced. 
Just as the decline in the relative size of the commodity agriculture sector of the
economy is driven by the income inelastic demand for raw food products, the rise
now in the importance of the environmental services supplied by agriculture is driven
by the suggested income elastic demand for these services15. In the absence of econo-
metric evidence for this assertion we can point to the demand for activities which are
market driven and which are associated with enjoyment of the natural, rural environ-
ment. These include the demand for day trips, week-end visits to beauty spots, heri-
tage sites, national parks, nature reserves, outdoor recreation activities and sports e.g.
equine activities. Other indicators are the membership of organisations devoted to
these environmental services. English examples of such organisations are the Wild-
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14 Which can well happen as the demographic structure of the population ages.
15 Income elasticity refers to the percentage change in quantity of food demanded per one percent
change in disposable incomes. For most basic food items this elasticity is less than unity so growth in in-
comes is accompanied by a steadily declining share of expenditure on food items.  However, given the
non-market nature of environmental services no empirical data exists from which to demonstrate the in-
come elasticity (ie greater than unity) for these services.  Whitby (1996) discusses this proposition.
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place in the countryside. In a large part of the land area of this group of countries,
these other countryside activities take place in, adjacent to, or over farmed land. The
biodiversity, condition of habitats and landscape, and the quality of the natural re-
sources (soil, air and water) are a very large part of what is considered the quality of
these experiences. In addition, of course, there is concern by most citizens for the
quality and quantity of these environmental features for their own sake –but this is
more difficult to measure17. 
These societal changes are demanding, and getting, two sorts of policy measures.
For the positive environmental services these countries have devised, and are still de-
vising, publicly-funded agri-environment schemes to purchase the services from far-
mers and other land managers. To reduce the negative externalities of agriculture
there is a growing body of environmental regulation. The most prominent examples
are the Birds, Habitats, Nitrates, Water Framework and Waste Directives of the EU.
Together with the national environmental legislation of the Member States, this cons-
titutes a large and complex set of instruments now in operation in each of these two
categories. The balance between these instruments and their efficacy are complex
subjects in their own right and the matter of much debate. 
In summary, regarding this fifth trend, citizens in these twelve, wealthy, popula-
tion-dense, parts of Europe now demand very high standards of environmental land
management, they want farmers not only to produce food, fibre and energy, but
they want green space, biodiversity, beautiful landscapes, preservation of historical
and heritage features in the countryside (including ancient agricultural buildings
which have long outlived their original purpose), and the achievement of very high
standards of soil, water and air protection. These demands, unsurprisingly, are ha-
ving a big impact on the EU rural policy debate as will be discussed in the sections
below.
The trends in the Southern 5 group of Member States18 are fundamentally no
different at all to the five listed above. The difference is one of degree not kind. All
the drivers of change are the same, and the political and institutional structures funda-
mentally the same too, it is only the starting date for the changes which is generally
later, and the extent of progress along these same paths which is generally smaller.
These differences result from lower development levels, and also perhaps some grea-
ter degree of conservativeness of these more traditional societies. However such is
the pace of economic integration, and all these countries are such extremely impor-
tant tourism destinations from the NW-12 (as well as from the rest of the world) that
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tor of ten, and also, noticeably, exceeding the total numbers of members of all political parties.  This gives
such groups important political legitimacy, well recognised in London, and in Brussels where these Bri-
tish organisations are highly active in their EU counterpart organisations.   
17 In addition to the large and still rapidly growing literature on the value of specific non-market en-
vironmental features and services, there are now attempts to aggregate these to assess the overall magni-
tude.  See the UK Government sponsored study to calibrate these environmental impacts, EFTEC (2004).  
18 It has to be acknowledged that information about the two new members of this group, Cyprus and
Malta is scant as they are both small and such recent members of the EU.
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S-5 and NW-12 groups will become indistinguishable –some regions are already. 
The environmental issues do however stand apart from this judgement. There is
no suggestion that the intensified agriculture in the Southern-5 is any less environ-
mentally damaging than that in the NW-12, although on-average it may have progres-
sed less far in many sectors. However, precisely because these countries are in the,
hotter and drier, South, their demands on water resources for agriculture may, in
some sectors, be more damaging. It is also the case that these countries have a large
proportion of their land in natural and semi-natural areas. What is suggested is that
the public valuation of the importance of this damage, and likewise the importance
given by the public in these countries to the provision of biodiversity, and landscape
amenity in rural areas may be noticeably lower than in the NW-12. If, as suggested
above, the income elasticity of demand for non-market environmental and cultural
landscape services delivered by farmers is greater than one then, with their lower in-
come levels we would expect lower demand for such services, and thus lower impor-
tance and values attached to such services. But it is quite possible that it is not only
that the income levels are lower, but that the income elasticity of demand is lower
too. Differences in climate, topography and thus flora and fauna, may have created a
different ethos about the countryside in the N and W of Europe compared to the
South. At its simplest, and at risk of gross over-simplification, after the blaze of
spring colour of the Mediterranean flora, the summer simply becomes too hot and the
farms and fields too dry, to support a summer agro-tourism. The attractions of the
coast are too great. Whatever the explanation, it is a matter of factual observation (see
below) that to date the Southern-5 have taken smaller opportunity than the NW-12 to
embrace agri-environment as a concept and a feature of their rural policy.
Turning to the Eastern-8, these countries abandoned their communist inspired,
centrally-planned economic systems, the one-party state control, and collective ow-
nership of land and capital from late 1989. Even before the Berlin Wall came down
their agricultural and rural sectors were subject to the same technological and econo-
mic driving forces as the rest of the world. The difference was that the ability to react
to these forces was circumscribed by their much more rigid political and economic
systems. That said the same pattern of large out-flow of labour from agriculture, the
substitution of labour by capital, the rise in the extent of food processing were all sha-
red outcomes. However none of these processes worked themselves out to the same
degree as in the West. In addition the quality of the capital investment, both on-farm
and off farm was poor compared to that in W Europe.
The process of farm structural change did take a quite different form than in W
Europe. Essentially, with the exceptions of Poland and Slovenia (which have to a
large extent retained a peasantry-based farming structure), there was a large pro-
gramme of collectivisation of farming. This proceeded at different pace and to diffe-
rent extent amongst these countries, but essentially it created a bi-polar structure of
very large State and Collective farms on the one hand, land a large number of peasant
small holdings and private plots on the other19. Actually, in most cases the land was
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neutralised, or expropriated, but the ownership rights stayed with the former owners.
This took place at different times in these countries from the 1920s in the Baltic Sta-
tes to the early 1950s in the Czech Republic and Hungary. From three to seven deca-
des later, following the collapse of the Communist systems, the process of restituting
these property rights commenced. This turns out to be a long and difficult process be-
cause land boundaries have changed; many of the former owners have left the land if
not the country. In addition, in many of these countries, as soon as the old system co-
llapsed there was an informal redistribution of useful agricultural capital as state and
collective farms were dismantled –sometimes literally, brick by brick. There was
much destruction of capital and, as a result in some cases, there was little incentive in
receiving back extremely small parcels of land where the associated capital had been
removed and the result was an asset of little productive worth.  
Summarising, in a traumatic decade of «liberalisation and privatisation» in the
1990s in most of this group, agricultural output and incomes declined, especially in
livestock production. The group as a whole switched from being significant net
agricultural exporters (mostly to the rest of the Soviet Union) to net-importers (to a
large extent from the EU-15). The initial years of this process involved extremely
painful adjustment. The large, state and collective farms and food processing enter-
prises formerly employing (actually under-employing) very large numbers of wor-
kers closed down overnight, there was huge unemployment. Cultivation of private
plots became even more important than in the former regime. Gradually, some of
the Eastern-8 are surmounting these difficulties, and agricultural production in
some commodities has now increased beyond that immediately prior to the drama-
tic reforms.
The EU attempted to manage the trade relations with the candidate countries th-
rough a series of Europe and Association agreements. The effects were closely moni-
tored, but mostly yielded little benefit to the putative Member States as their agricul-
ture was unable to respond. These are extensively analysed in Tracy (1994) and
Tangermann and Banse (2000). 
The input supply and food industries also suffered during this reform period.
Their plant, equipment and technology were poor. The resulting quality of the pro-
duce, by W European standards was poor. Because it was decided early that these
countries would be able to join the EU, they were given preferential market access to
the EU in the form of so-called Europe Agreements. For a variety of reasons the agri-
cultural trade balance with the EU, which had been a net surplus, was reversed espe-
cially for processed food. Consumers in these countries were very interested in ha-
ving access to the huge range, variety and quality of Western European products.
The natural advantage of lower wage and land costs in the east is still, by and large
neutralised by the even lower productivity and by the incapacity, yet, to match the W
European requirements for product quality and consistency and reliability of produc-
tion.
As far as the two other trends discussed at length above for the NW-12 member
States of the EU, the story is different in the Eastern-8. It is probably true to say that
most citizens of these countries are just as divorced from the basics of food produc-
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teristic in the NW-12 group is how vocal groups amongst these disconnected consu-
mers are now making big demands about the production systems and technologies,
the ethics and environmental effects of agriculture, this is much less apparent in the
Eastern-8.  The demands on agriculture, and for that matter on the rural economy are
much simpler –for food and for jobs– rather than the non-market environmental ser-
vices described for the NW-12. How fast this will change is hard to predict.
4. Lessons from EU Rural Development strategies and policies
It is presumed here that readers are familiar with what the past Rural Develop-
ment Strategies have been. For those who are not, a most helpful and succinct sum-
mary of historical development of EU Rural Development Policy provided by Chap-
ter 1 of the EU Commission’s Extended Impact Assessment, Commission (2004).
The same source also provides a clear account of the Current EU Rural Development
Policy for 2000-2006, and this is quoted below.
«Under Agenda 2000 rural development policy was to officially become the 2nd
pillar of the CAP, on the one hand to accompany the further reform of market policy
across the whole of European territory and on the other integrated with Structural
Funds policy in Objective 1 regions.
All existing measures and instruments were brought into a single legal framework
based on multi-annual programming. The rural development regulation 1257/99 of-
fers MS and regions a menu of 22 measures (extended to 26 with the mid term review
CAP reform) from which they can design their rural development programmes in
function of their needs in terms of agricultural restructuring, environment and rural
development beyond the farm.
In addition to the mainstream rural development programmes, the Community
Initiative LEADER continued in its 3rd generation (LEADER+), fostering innovative
and bottom up approaches to local integrated rural development.
The mid term review (MTR) of the CAP, built into Agenda 2000, brought further
important decisions in 2003 on reform of the 1st pillar, introducing a further decou-
pling of support from production in the form of the Single Farm Payment (SFP) ba-
sed on an historical reference, cross compliance (statutory and other conditions to be
respected by the farmer to receive his full SFP) and a Community modulation scheme
(reducing SFPs and allowing a transfer of funds from the 1st to the 2nd pillar).
For rural development policy, being only half way through the [2000-2006] pro-
gramming period, it was decided not to fundamentally alter the basic framework, but
to add two new chapters to the rural development regulation on helping farmers to
meet demanding standards and on food quality and to extend the agri-environment
chapter to include animal welfare. In the light of consumer concerns about food sa-
fety and quality and about production methods an expansion of the available rural
development tool kit was deemed necessary, complementing and reinforcing the 1st
pillar reforms.
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centrates on providing a basic income support to farmers, who are further free to
produce in function of market demand. To receive this support farmers must respect
statutory requirements (18 standards in the field of environment, public, animal and
plant health and animal welfare) and keep their land in good agricultural and envi-
ronmental conditions (also when deciding not to produce).
Beyond these baseline requirements, the 2nd pillar of the CAP rural development
policy supports agriculture and rural areas, in particular agriculture as a provider of
public goods in its environmental and rural functions. Three main domains of inter-
vention can be identified: agricultural restructuring, environment/land management
and wider rural development.
The two diagrams on the following page show in a very schematic way the rela-
tions between the 1st and the 2nd pillar.
For the ten new MS, joining in 2004, certain adaptations of the CAP in the light of
their situation have been necessary. The 1st pillar direct payments are only gradually
phased in, while they have received a considerable rural development allocation to
help face their restructuring needs. In addition, several specific rural development
measures are available such as support for semi-subsistence farming».
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Having explained what EU Rural Development Policy is, an attempt is now made
to answer the question set for this section: what are the lessons in Europe from the
way we have gone about policy for Rural Development?  
What will not be done here is to examine the cost effectiveness of the 26 specific
Rural Development measures which make up the current Rural Development Regula-
tion. This is for two reasons. First they have been in operation for such a short period
of time the evaluations which have been conducted have not been published. Second,
in the context of trying to explain the different levels of development achieved across
the EU Member States and regions these measures are not the most important deter-
minants. Even if we take a country which has shown tremendous economic develop-
ment, including rural development, in the last three decades, Ireland, the impact of
agricultural policy and rural development policy has been modest. Of far greater
importance was the general economic policies, the development of infrastructure –ai-
ded greatly by EU structural policy, the education and training system and the encou-
ragement and success of attracting inward investment. 
Some of the main lessons from this complex evolution of agricultural and rural
development policy in Europe are therefore summarised in the following fashion.
It is worth remembering that the rural development efforts under discussion take
place in non-agrarian countries all of which have developed to the point that agricul-
ture is already below 25% of GDP, for most it is well below 15% and for the biggest
12 countries it is below 5%. In this context the economic development of rural areas
is primarily a result of general economic development. Countries which have high
general living standards and income levels also have rural areas which have high in-
comes and living standards.
Thus the best and most successful rural development policy is the most successful
general economic development policy. The main relevant policy elements will be ge-
neral macro-economic, i.e. fiscal and monetary policy, the micro-economic, legal and
institutional arrangements and how enterprise-friendly they are, and then the policies
for education, health, social, transport and other infra-structure.
In Europe all these principal aspect of policy are in Member State competence
and thus the variations in success of Rural Development around the regions of Eu-
rope are mostly explained by the variations in success of these general policies of the
member States.
Within the context set by these general policies which are usually framed for the
whole country and do not differentiate between rural areas and urban areas, are anot-
her set of provisions which have big impacts on the rural areas and how they develop.
These are particularly the fiscal system and the planning system. Many countries
have favourable fiscal provision for the treatment of income, capital and inheritance
of farmers. There are often differential and favourable capital allowances, duties for
fuel and local taxes for farmers, all of which can influence the development of farm
and rural businesses. Likewise, the way land is zoned, and controls on development
in rural areas has a big impact on employment creation and housing costs which are
major influencers of rural development.  
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field of application and power from the point of view of ensuring viable rural econo-
mies and communities than was commonly thought when the heavy agricultural pro-
tection was put in place in the 1950s.
Of course farmers are still a principal occupational class who only exist in rural
areas, whose primary role is to provide in food, fibre and, increasingly, renewable
energy and who will, in Europe manage the majority of the land surface to do so. This
inevitably means that their production activities have a strong environmental impact
and their existence across the territory plays a vital social role in the rural areas. 
The point is that because there are serious problems of non-existent markets and
market failures surrounding the environmental and social functions, then markets
alone will not supply such functions. This means that either they are provided (as in
the past 45 years in the EU) by cross-subsidy from an well-developed highly-protec-
tive agricultural policy, or they will have to be provided for in a more direct and tar-
geted way. Failing either, the services will not be supplied and European societies are
likely to judge this is a deterioration in the quality of their rural areas. 
The point we have reached in the EU is where these issues are now being unders-
tood and teased out. The challenge as seen by a recent ad hoc group of experts who
tried to define a vision for rural policy for the EU, von Urff et al (2003) is to find the
right balance between: 
• sectorally based measures which assist the restructuring of farming busines-
ses, and the development of value-added, high quality, produce, and improve
the marketing for the land based sectors (farming and forestry), and 
• territorially defined measures to stimulate the diversification of the economic
base of the rural areas, capitalising wherever possible on local and regional distincti-
veness, and measures to facilitate the delivery of environmental and cultural lands-
cape services which can only be delivered by land managers. 
This reaches the nub of the current debate on Rural Development Policy in the
EU. It found expression in the debate over the appropriate balance between the what
the Commission has defined as the three axes of rural development: 
• The Competitiveness of Farming and Forestry.
• Environmental Land Management.
• Wider Rural Development.
Precisely because the development levels around the EU Member States is so dif-
ferent it is very difficult to prescribe a balance between these objectives to suit all
countries. It is clear that agriculture in several of the new Member States has a great
deal to do to raise productivity and restructure to survive in the new market context in
which it now finds itself. This gives greatest prominence to the measures under the
Competitiveness of Farming and Forestry axis.  This is a particular challenge for Po-
land where three-quarters of the sector resisted the restructuring under the communist
regime. Equally these countries have a lot of catching-up in developing the expected
standards of food quality and consistency of supply of the modern food industry. Ho-
wever most of the stimulus for this will be private sector, rather than policy induced.
In both the Eastern-8 and Southern-5 there is a big challenge to develop rural econo-
mies to absorb the excess labour in agriculture. Thus the Wider Rural Development
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tern-12 a stronger desire to use the Environmental Land Management measures of
the Rural Development policy. The outcome of the debate over the balance between
these aspects of rural development was to set in the Strategic Framework for Rural
Development for 2007-2013 minimum expenditure weights of 10%, 25% and 10%
for the above three axes.  
If there are such different needs from Rural Development Policy amongst the
countries in Europe this inevitably invites the question why have a common policy at
all? Why not decentralise this policy, avoid prescribing the balance, and let regions
choose for themselves what makes up the most intelligent balance of Rural Develop-
ment measures in relation to the mix of problems they have. If different countries
have different Rural Development needs, what is the logic of having a common rural
development policy for Europe, collectively financed from the EU budget, within the
framework of the Common Agricultural Policy? 
Three answers are offered to this question. First, there is a path dependency invol-
ved here. Rural Development policy is slowly emerging in Europe by a process of
transformation of agricultural policy. As the CAPis a core spending policy of the EU,
therefore the emerging RDP policy is too. The very process of transformation, swit-
ching funds from Pillar 1 (the agricultural supports) to Pillar 2, the new and growing
Rural Development policy means more of the expenditure is co-financed, so there is
an element of decentralisation inherent in this switch. Second, the environmental ele-
ments of the RD policy deal heavily with EU-wide environmental problems. These
genuinely are mostly trans-boundary problems, birds and animals migrate, river
catchments cross borders, the atmosphere is pervasive, thus an EU-wide approach to
regulation within the single market is essential. Third, part of the point of EU-wide
policy is for social cohesion, or solidarity. This is the word given to the redistributive
social objective of Europe whereby the richer Member States provide financial help
to the less developed regions from a common budget.
However during the strongly fought discussions in 2005 over the size and compo-
sition of the total EU budget for the period 2007-2013 there was not much enthu-
siasm expressed for more budget-based cohesion measures. The six largest net contri-
butors to the EU budget (Germany, United Kingdom, France, Netherlands, Sweden,
Austria) fought hard to contain the total EU budget to little over 1% of EU National
Income.  In the process the funds for the Pillar 1 agricultural supports were maintai-
ned and it was plans to expand Rural Development expenditure which were curtailed. 
5. What policies are needed to adapt to open markets and
globalisation?
This is precisely the question which has confronted the EU in its intensive debate
over the reform of the CAP –both the pillar 1 market supports and direct payments
and the Pillar 2 Rural Development Policy. The reforms to the CAP agreed in 2003
for Pillar 1 and 2004 for Pillar 2, were, inevitably, a political compromise, and did
not really satisfy any of the stakeholder groups in EU society. The main beneficiaries
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(perceived) benefits. Environmental groups seem always to want faster and bigger
improvements to the environment. Taxpayer interests resent the high budget costs of
the CAP. Consumer interests constantly push for higher food quality. 
There is an acceptance that production and trade distorting agricultural subsidies
have to be reduced or phased out. But equally there is general acceptance in Euro-
pean society that removing all assistance to farmers is not acceptable for the social
and environmental consequences that would result20.
The longer term future of the Pillar 1 decoupled payments is in doubt. This issue
is not a matter of strong debate, yet. But in the 2005 EU Budget settlement the Com-
mission has been asked to provide a review in 2008/09 of all EU policies including
the CAP and the EU budgetary resources. This review is bound to examine the ba-
lance between the two CAP pillars and ways of shifting this balance –either by redu-
cing or eliminating the Pillar 1 payments, redistributing them, or switching resources
from Pillar 1 to Pillar 2.  
There is a low level debate in the EU on the appropriate instruments which should
be available for dealing with the increasing volatility of the business environment in
which farmers are operating. This increase in volatility partly comes from the greater
exposure to international markets as the protection previously offered by the CAP is
gradually dismantled. It also comes from restrictions on technologies farmers may
use to deal with crop and animal pests and disease and weeds. As international travel
and transport of plant and animal products expand, the speed of transmission of ani-
mal and plant disease increases. Europe has had its share of dramatic epidemics of
animal disease. European farmers are also facing greater volatility in energy prices
and in exchange rates. Finally, climate experts warn that global climate change brings
a greater frequency of extreme weather events to which agriculture is particularly ex-
posed. There is scope for greater international discussion on the appropriate tools to
enable food producers, indeed the whole food chain, to deal with all this uncertainty.
At present this is dealt with in very different ways around the world, and even within
the EU. 
An important dimension of managing this increased uncertainty and risk is in
equipping farmers or the managers of the producer-controlled businesses who market
the produce (and purchase the inputs) with the knowledge and capability to manage
risk. Actually this is just part of the on-going need for higher standards of manage-
ment ability of farmers or farm managers. In Europe this demands not only business
management skills including information processing skills, but also the capacity for
quite sophisticated management of the natural resources (soil, water, air) at their dis-
posal as well a managing the landscape, biodiversity and heritage found on their land.
An important rural policy goal especially in the Eastern-8 group of Member Sta-
tes concerns land reform and farm restructuring. The main EU contribution to such
matters has generally been confined to schemes to encourage early retirement and the
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grounds they contain high dead weight costs (ie they pay people to do what they were
anyway going to do without payment). As far as land reparcelling and amalgamation,
there is little taste in the EU to fund this centrally. Land restitution and ownership
questions are also too sensitive and left to Member States.  
It is often expressed in Europe that with the high labour and land costs farmers
face compared to their competitors in most other parts of the world, Europe’s compa-
rative advantage can never be in commodity production but must be in high quality,
high value, usually more processed and certainly differentiated produce. An impor-
tant development in EU policy has therefore been to assist the development of market
segmentation and product differentiation. These are important elements of the second
Pillar Rural Development programmes.
Environmental management is becoming a larger challenge for all European
farmers, indeed all European land managers. The coverage of areas designated for
the protection of birds and habitats, as nitrate sensitive, or «at risk» for other forms
of diffuse pollution (particularly the phosphate and soil load of rivers and other wa-
ter bodies) under both EU environmental legislation and national legislation is gro-
wing. There are more environmental regulations in preparation –particularly the
Water Framework Directive and a Soils Directive. In addition member States and
regions designate land, for example, as National Parks, Areas of Outstanding Na-
tional Beauty, Green Belt, and so on21. Each such piece of environmental legisla-
tion adds restrictions to what can be done on and to the land. Nearly all such res-
trictions impose costs. Society is no doubt right to demand ever-higher standards of
management of natural resources, and to wish to protect biodiversity and lands-
cape. The policy issue is how the costs are shared. This is the continual debate on
property rights. In the contest of private ownership of land who has the right to de-
cide how it is used, whether to produce marketed goods (food, fibre and fuel) or
public environmental goods (landscape, biodiversity, heritage). At root here is also
the extent to which, through ever-higher regulatory costs imposed on its own agri-
culture, European pollution is exported to other regions, as food production in Eu-
rope is restricted and imports rise.
A related issue for Europe’s rural areas now under debate is the appropriate con-
tribution land management can and should play in mitigating and adapting to global
climate change. In contrast to all other productive sectors of the economy, whose
only role is to reduce carbon emissions (e.g., by improving fuel efficiency), the land
based sector has, in addition [because it too has to reduce its Green House Gas
(GHG) Emissions], the potential to play several positive roles. Through land use
change: arable land to grassland; and grassland to forest; carbon can be sequestered
in soil and timber. Land cover and management can play an important role in water
run-off and flood management. In addition, with the appropriate energy policy and
fiscal regime, land-based renewable energy can substitute for fossil fuels in electri-
city, heat, and transport fuels, and timber can be substituted for heavily GHG emit-
ting products like brick, steel and concrete. 
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eing the scale of the policy and the balance of these objectives and measures. The
goal is simple to state, but hard to achieve, or even know if we are achieving it; sus-
tainable rural development.
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